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In this study, I examine the determinants and consequences of quarterly management guidance of 
key performance indicators (KPIs). I use a novel dataset of 457 firm-quarter observations in the 
airline industry and hand-collect information on the existence and properties of quarterly KPI 
guidance. Specifically, I collect data on quarterly KPI guidance for three KPIs used in airline the 
industry: available seat miles, revenue per available seat mile, and cost per available seat mile. 
Consistent with managers using quarterly KPI guidance to reduce analyst uncertainty, I find that 
managers are more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance when initial analyst earnings per share 
(EPS) forecasts errors are large. I also find that firms with high analyst following, high growth 
prospects, and low financial performance are more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance. I next 
examine whether quarterly KPI guidance is associated with improvements analyst EPS forecasts 
and find that quarterly KPI guidance is associated with reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors 
which results in more accurate analyst estimates of EPS at the end of the quarter. Together, these 
results demonstrate that quarterly KPI guidance is an alternative form of guidance that managers 
can use to reduce information asymmetry with analysts by providing forward-looking information 
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Earnings guidance is one of the primary ways that managers convey information about 
future firm performance to shareholders. However, there has been considerable debate on whether 
managers should provide quarterly earnings guidance to investors. Proponents of quarterly 
earnings guidance argue that guidance is useful because it allows managers to improve investors' 
ability to predict future earnings, increases analyst following, and decreases the risk of litigation.1 
In contrast, critics argue that quarterly earnings guidance is costly to produce, promotes managerial 
myopia.2 Although prior research finds evidence in support of both arguments, in practice, many 
firms are doing away with this disclosure.3 While the provision of quarterly earnings guidance has 
declined, management guidance for key performance indicators (KPIs) has increased 
considerably.4 Unlike financial performance measures, KPIs incorporate information about firm 
performance that is unique to the operations of the firm such as subscriber growth in the 
entertainment service industry and available seat miles in the airline industry. 
While firms are increasing their guidance on KPIs, it is not clear whether quarterly KPI 
guidance influences expectations about future financial performance. Thus, in this study, I 
investigate an alternative mechanism through which managers can provide forward-looking 
information about future financial performance to market participants, quarterly KPI guidance. 
 
1 See The Case for Guidance by Baruch Lev in the Wall Street Journal. Available at: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203391104577124243623258110 
2 For example, in a Wall Street Journal editorial written in 2018, Warren Buffett and Jamie Dimon state “we are 
encouraging all public companies to consider moving away from providing quarterly earnings-per-share guidance. In 
our experience, quarterly earnings guidance often leads to an unhealthy focus on short-term profits at the expense of 
long-term strategy, growth and sustainability.” Short-Termism is Harming the Economy available at: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/short-termism-is-harming-the-economy-1528336801?ns=prod/accounts-wsj 
3 The percentage of firms in the S&P 500 providing quarterly EPS guidance dropped from 36% in 2010 to 27.8% in 
2016. See Moving Beyond Quarterly Guidance: A Relic of the Past available at: 
https://www.fcltglobal.org/docs/default-source/publications/moving-past-quarterly-guidance---a-relic-of-the-
past.pdf?sfvrsn=77a9268c_2 
4 I find the percentage of firms that provide quarter KPI guidance in the airline industry increased from 41% of firms 
in 2008 to 98% of firms in 2017.  
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Specifically, I examine the determinants of quarterly KPI guidance and whether KPI guidance is 
associated with improvements in analyst estimates of earnings in the airline industry.   
Historically, KPIs were used solely for internal performance evaluation, however, public 
disclosure of KPIs is becoming more prevalent. For example, former SEC Commissioner Kara M. 
Stein states that “Alternative measures—such as non-GAAP metrics and KPIs—that were once 
used sparingly, now appear in a host of documents and situations, including roadshows, analyst 
meetings, and quarterly earnings calls.”5 In addition to the increasing use of KPIs in firm filings, 
managers are also starting to provide guidance on KPIs along with, or in the place of, earnings 
guidance. For example, in the airline industry, management KPI guidance is discussed in earnings 
reports alongside financial measures in both firm filings and press coverage.6 In order to examine 
why firms are increasingly providing quarterly KPI guidance, I first examine the determinants of 
quarterly KPI guidance.  
 Next, I examine the consequences of firms providing quarterly KPI guidance. Specifically, 
I first examine whether management guidance is associated with analyst earnings forecasts errors. 
There are several reasons why quarterly KPI guidance would be useful for analysts forecasting 
earnings. First, prior research provides evidence that analysts incorporate information from 
management guidance of earnings into their earnings estimates (e.g., Waymire 1986; Baginsky 
and Hassell 1990; and Williams 1996). While quarterly KPI guidance does not directly provide 
analysts with management’s expectations of realized earnings, it does provide them with 
management’s expectations about the underlying operations of the firm that contributes to their 
 
5  Available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-stein-102318 
6  For example, in their coverage of United Airlines Holding’s 3rd quarter earnings announcement, CNBC reported 
that “Revenue per available seat mile, a key industry metric that measures how much an airline is earning for each 
seat it flies a mile, rose 1.7%, in line with United’s forecast over the summer. United expects this metric to rise no 
more than 2% in the fourth quarter.” Available at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/15/united-airlines-q3-2019-
earnings.html 
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ability to generate future earnings. Second, prior research shows that management has an 
information advantage over analysts when performance resides at the firm level (Hutton et al. 
2012). Because KPIs are specific measures idiosyncratic to the firm or industry, managers should 
be able to form more accurate predictions of future realizations of KPIs in their quarterly KPI 
guidance. Third, prior literature finds that periodically reported KPIs are both value relevant to 
investors and useful for predicting future financial performance, which provides evidence that 
periodically reported KPIs provide incremental information about the underlying operations of the 
firm that is useful for market participants (e.g., Amir and Lev 1996; Behn and Riley 1999; Riley 
et al. 2003). Thus, to the degree that KPI guidance is an accurate representation of future 
operations, KPI guidance should influence analysts’ expectations about future earnings. Finally, 
Givoly et al. (2019) examine analyst forecasts of KPIs and find that analysts revise their forecasts 
of earnings when periodically reported KPIs exceed analyst estimates.7  This result provides some 
evidence that analysts incorporate information about realized values of KPIs in their estimates of 
earnings.  
However, there are also reasons why quarterly KPI guidance may not be useful for analysts. 
First, despite prior research documenting the value relevance and predictive ability of KPIs, both 
investors and regulators have concerns that the subjective nature of KPIs may render them of little 
use or may even mislead investors in their evaluation of firm performance.8 Because managers 
may have greater discretion in their measurement of reported KPIs in both guidance and periodic 
reports, inconsistent measurement of KPIs could limit the usefulness of quarterly KPI guidance to 
analysts. Second, while managers’ information about operations provides them with an 
 
7 Givoly et al. (2019) use publicly available data on analyst estimates of KPIs across the four most covered industries: 
airline, oil and gas, retail, and pharmaceutical firms.  
8 See The Pitfalls of Non-GAAP Metrics available at: https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-pitfalls-of-non-gaap-
metrics/  
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information advantage in forecasting KPIs, prior research documents that managers also have 
incentives to provide inaccurate or misleading guidance (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005). Thus, 
whether quarterly KPI guidance improves analysts' forecasts of earnings is an empirical question.  
To examine the determinants of quarterly KPI guidance and whether quarterly KPI 
guidance improves analyst forecasts of earnings, I use a sample of 457 firm-quarter observations 
from 2008 through 2017 in the airline industry. I focus on the airline industry because unlike other 
industries where the decision to report periodic KPIs is voluntary, firms in the airline industry are 
required to provide periodic reports of actual KPIs to regulators and market participants. Thus, this 
setting allows me to investigate a manager’s decision to provide quarterly KPI guidance in a setting 
that holds constant their decision to provide periodic reports of KPIs. In addition, the airline 
industry is historically difficult to evaluate due because firm performance is often both seasonal 
and volatile, thus, market participants are likely to benefit from increased disclosure. I identify 
three prominent KPIs reported in the airline industry: available seat miles (ASM), revenue per 
available seat mile (RASM), and costs per available seat mile (CASM). ASM are measured as the 
number of seats available for sale multiplied by the number of miles flown, thus, ASM provides a 
measure of an airline’s capacity. RASM is measured as total revenues scaled by ASM and provides 
a measure of unit revenues while CASM is measured as total costs excluding fuel scaled by ASM 
which provides a measure of unit costs.9 To construct a measure of KPI guidance for each firm-
quarter observation, I hand collect quarterly KPI guidance from firm filings reported on the 
Security and Exchange Comission’s (SEC) EDGAR website and find that 298 or 65% of firms 
provide quarterly KPI guidance for at least one KPI in my sample. In addition, I find that disclosure 
 
9 Firms provide periodic disclosures of CASM both including fuel costs and excluding fuel costs (CASM ex-fuel). 
However, because fuel costs are difficult for managers to predict, managers often only provide guidance for CASM 
ex-fuel so I focus on CASM ex-fuel and refer to this measure as CASM throughout the manuscript. In addition, all 
firms in my sample that provide guidance on CASM including fuel also provide guidance for CASM ex-fuel.  
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of quarterly KPI guidance is increasing significantly over my sample from 41% of firms providing 
quarterly KPI guidance in 2008 up to 98% in 2017.  
I first examine determinants of quarterly KPI guidance and determinants using two 
outcomes: the probability of providing quarterly guidance for at least one KPI (i.e., ASM, RASM, 
or CASM) and the number of KPIs that a firm provides. I find that firms are more likely to provide 
quarterly guidance for at least one KPI when they are smaller, experiencing low growth, and have 
higher analyst following. In addition, I find that firms are more likely to provide KPI guidance and 
provide for firms when initial analyst EPS forecast errors are large, which provides some evidence 
that managers provide guidance on KPIs when analyst uncertainty is high.  
I next examine whether there is a reduction in analyst forecast errors for firms that provide 
quarterly KPI guidance. To test this, I measure the change in analyst earnings forecast errors as 
the difference between the absolute value of the last consensus analyst EPS forecast error prior to 
the end of the fiscal quarter and the absolute value initial consensus analyst EPS forecast error 
earnings forecast.10 Consistent with quarterly KPI guidance providing useful information to 
analysts for estimating future financial performance, I find a larger reduction in analyst forecast 
errors for firm-quarters when management provides quarterly KPI guidance relative to firm-
quarters without quarterly KPI guidance. Although this test allows me to examine whether firms 
that provide quarterly KPI guidance experience larger reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors, 
because managers are more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance when initial analyst EPS 
forecast errors are large, it is not clear whether this reduction results in more accurate analyst 
 
10 In my sample, all quarterly KPI guidance is announced after the initial consensus analyst EPS forecasts are made 
and before the last consensus analyst EPS forecasts are made.  
 
6 
forecasts of EPS at the end of the period.11 Thus, I next test whether quarterly KPI guidance is 
associated with lower analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the quarter and find a negative 
association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the 
period. Together, these results provide evidence that analyst EPS forecasts improve following 
quarterly KPI guidance and this improvement leads to more accurate analyst EPS forecasts at the 
end of the fiscal quarter.  
I perform two additional tests to examine whether the properties of quarterly KPI guidance 
impact the association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst EPS forecast errors. First, I 
examine whether the association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst forecasts errors is 
more pronounced when managers provide quarterly KPI guidance alongside quarterly earnings 
guidance (i.e., bundled guidance) relative to firms that provide stand-alone KPI guidance. I find 
both bundled quarterly KPI guidance and stand-alone quarterly KPI guidance are associated with 
larger reductions in analyst forecast errors relative to firm-quarters without quarterly KPI 
guidance, however, I do not find evidence that bundled KPI guidance is associated with a larger 
reduction relative to stand-alone KPI guidance. In contrast, I do find evidence that analyst EPS 
forecast errors at the end of the quarter are lower for firms with bundled forecasts relative to firms 
that provide stand-alone quarterly guidance and analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the quarter 
are lower for both forms of quarterly KPI guidance relative to firms that do not disclose quarterly 
KPI guidance.  
 
11 For example, if average absolute analyst EPS forecast errors for firms that provide a quarterly KPI forecast are 
initially 15% of share price and are revised to 10% of share price by the end of the quarter while absolute analyst EPS 
forecast errors for firms that do not provide quarterly KPI forecasts are initially 10% of share price and are revised to 
8% of share price by the end of the quarter, I would observe a larger reduction in analyst forecast errors for quarterly 
KPI guidance firms, however, the final analyst estimate would still be more accurate for firms that do not provide 
quarterly KPI guidance. 
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Second, I examine whether the association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst 
forecast errors varies when managers forecast point estimates of KPIs in quarterly KPI guidance 
relative to range forecasts of KPIs in quarterly KPI guidance. I find no difference in analyst EPS 
forecast errors between the point and range KPI guidance, however, both forms of KPI guidance 
exhibit larger reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors and lower analyst EPS forecast errors prior 
to the end of the quarter relative to firms that do not provide quarterly KPI guidance.  
This study contributes to the literature examining voluntary disclosure and, more 
specifically, to the literature examining management guidance. To date, research on management 
guidance has primarily focused on quarterly and annual guidance of earnings.12 In contrast, this 
study focuses on an alternative form of guidance: quarterly KPI guidance and provides evidence 
that analyst earnings forecasts are more accurate in quarters when management provides quarterly 
KPI guidance. In addition, this study contributes to the debate on the value relevance of KPI in 
evaluating firm performance because, unlike prior studies which focus primarily on periodic 
reporting of KPIs (e.g., Amir and Lev 1996; Behn and Riley 1999; Hughes 2000; Rajgopal et al. 
2003; Riley et al. 2003), my results provide evidence that managers may be able to use quarterly 
KPI guidance as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry between insiders and analysts. 
Finally, given the proliferation of firms providing guidance on KPIs, my findings should be of 
interest to investors who follow firms that provide quarterly KPI guidance and regulators who are 
evaluating the relative costs and benefits of supplementing financial information with KPIs in 
financial statements.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses prior literature 
and develops my expectations. Section III describes my sample selection and variable 
 
12 See Hirst et al. (2008) for a review of the management earnings guidance literature.   
8 
measurement, Section IV describes my research design, Section V discusses my empirical results, 
and Section IV provides a summary and conclusion.  
  
9 
2. Prior Literature and Development of Expectations 
 
Determinants of Quarterly KPI Guidance 
  
Following the release of a report by the CFA Institute and Business Roundtable Institute 
arguing that quarterly earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia and with continued pressure 
from investors and consultants to reduce quarterly earnings guidance, many firms are abandoning 
the practice of providing quarterly earnings guidance to market particiapnts (CFA Institute 2006). 
However, while quarterly earnings guidance is in decline, more firms are beginning to provide 
quarterly KPI guidance. Because prior studies examining voluntary disclosure typically focus on 
the determinants of management guidance for financial measures such as earnings, revenues, and 
cash flows, I first explore the determinants of management providing quarterly KPI guidance to 
provide insights into the types of firms that provide this disclosure.  
First, I identify factors external to the firm that may influence a manager's decision to 
provide quarterly KPI guidance. Prior research provides evidence that a firm’s voluntary 
disclosures are influenced by analysts’ demands for information (Chapman and Green 2018). For 
example, Chapman and Green (2018) use textual analysis of conference calls and find that 
managers are more likely to provide continued forward-looking guidance on items that analysts 
request in the conference call. In addition. Thus, to the extent that managers use quarterly KPI 
guidance to reduce analyst uncertainty, I expect a positive association between quarterly KPI 
guidance and initial analyst EPS forecast errors. Next, I examine whether analyst following is 
associated with quarterly KPI guidance because prior studies document that analysts are more 
likely to follow firms with a transparent reporting environment (Healy et al. 1999; Graham et al. 
2005; Hutton, Lee, and Shu 2012). Thus, to the extent that KPI guidance provides useful 
information to analysts in forming expectations about future firm performance, I expect a positive 
10 
association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst following. Next, I examine whether 
institutional ownership is associated with quarterly KPI guidance. While prior studies generally 
find that institutional ownership is higher for firms that provide earnings guidance (e.g., Healy et 
al. 1999; Anilowski et al. 2007), Bushee and Noe (2000) find that only ownership by transient 
institutions and quasi-indexers is higher for guiding firms. Therefore, I do not make a prediction 
on the association between institutional ownership and quarterly KPI guidance.  
I next identify firm-level characteristics that may influence a manager’s decision to provide 
quarterly KPI guidance. First, I examine whether managers’ decision to provide quarterly earnings 
guidance is associated with a managers’ decision to provide quarterly KPI guidance. There may 
be a positive association between quarterly earnings guidance and quarterly KPI guidance because 
managers may supplement forward-looking financial information with KPIs to provide additional 
context to investors and analysts about the underlying operations of the firm that contribute to 
management’s expectations of future earnings. However, given the downward trend of quarterly 
KPI guidance and the increasing trend of quarterly KPI guidance, firms may be substituting 
quarterly KPI guidance in the place of quarterly earnings guidance. Thus, I make no prediction for 
the association between quarterly earnings guidance and quarterly KPI guidance.  
Next, I examine whether firm growth is associated with quarterly KPI guidance. On one 
hand, managers of growing firms may be more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance because 
prior literature documents that managers are more forthcoming with voluntary disclosure when 
growth prospects are high (Atiase et al. 2005; Hollander et al. 2010). On the other hand, prior 
research also provides evidence that firms with high growth also face higher proprietary costs for 
providing quarterly earnings guidance (Verrecchia 1983; Ajinkya et al. 2005). However, to the 
extent that quarterly KPI guidance has a lower proprietary cost to managers relative to quarterly 
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earnings guidance, I expect there will be a positive association between firm growth and quarterly 
KPI guidance. Finally, I examine whether prior period performance is associated with a manager’s 
decision to provide quarterly KPI guidance. While prior literature generally finds that firm 
performance is positively associated with the managers’ decision to provide quarterly earnings 
guidance (e.g., Miller 2002; Houston et al. 2010), however, managers be more likely to provide 
quarterly KPI guidance in an effort to contextualize poor prior performance or use quarterly KPI 
guidance to emphasize the relative importance of periodic KPI reporting relative to earnings in 
upcoming periods, therefore I do not make a prediction for the association between firm 
performance and quarterly KPI guidance.  
Quarterly KPI Guidance and Analyst Forecasts 
In my second set of tests, I examine whether quarterly KPI guidance results in 
improvements in quarterly analyst EPS forecasts. Quarterly KPI guidance should provide useful 
information for analysts in forming their estimates of quarterly earnings for several reasons. First, 
prior research finds evidence that analysts incorporate information from management earnings 
guidance in their estimates. For example, Waymire (1986) finds evidence that annual earnings 
guidance by managers is more accurate than the consensus analyst forecast preceding management 
guidance, however, following the release of management earnings guidance, analyst earnings 
forecast errors are reduced and analyst earnings forecast errors are no different than management 
earnings guidance errors. In addition, Baginsky and Hassell (1990) find that analysts revise their 
annual earnings forecasts in response to management earnings guidance and the magnitude of their 
revision is associated with the returns around the release of the management earnings guidance. In 
addition, Williams (1996) finds that analyst earnings forecast revisions following management 
earnings guidance are higher when management earnings guidance in prior periods is more 
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accurate. Thus, to the extent that quarterly KPI guidance is useful for predicting future earnings 
and management provides accurate estimates of future realizations of KPIs, quarterly KPI 
guidance should improve analyst estimates of earnings.  
Second, prior research provides evidence that managers have an information advantage 
over analysts when reported performance is driven by firm operations rather than macroeconomic 
shocks (Hutton et al. 2012). Specifically, Hutton et al. (2012) argue that because managers are able 
to observe the daily operations of a firm, managers will provide more accurate forecasts than 
analysts when a firm’s future financial performance is more directly tied to the internal operations 
of the firm. Consistent with this, Hutton et al. (2012) find that management earnings guidance is 
more accurate relative to analyst forecasts when firms experience shocks to their operations in the 
prior period such as excess capacity or increases in abnormal inventory. Because quarterly KPI 
guidance provides analysts with management’s expectations about the firm’s internal operations, 
quarterly KPI guidance should lower any information asymmetry between managers and analysts 
resulting in improved analyst estimates of earnings. 
Third, although my study is the first to examine forward-looking disclosures of KPIs, prior 
research examines periodically reported KPIs and find evidence that periodically reported KPIs 
are value relevant to investors and are useful for predicting future financial performance. For 
example, Amir and Lev (1996) examine periodic disclosures of KPIs in the telecommunications 
industry and find that, while there is no association between stand-alone financial performance 
and returns for these firms, there is an association between population coverage and market 
penetration (two prominent KPIs in the telecommunications industry) and returns. Furthermore, 
subsequent research finds that periodically reported KPIs are also value relevant for firms in the 
electric utility industry (Hughes 2000), the e-commerce industry (Trueman et al. 2000), the 
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manufacturing industry (Rajgopal et al. 2003), and the airline industry (Riley et al. 2003; Francis 
et al. 2003).  
In addition to the value relevance of KPIs, prior research also finds that periodically 
reported KPIs are useful for predicting future financial performance. Most related to my study, 
Behn and Riley (1999) examine periodic reports of KPIs in the airline industry and find that ASM, 
on-time arrival rates, mishandled baggage, and customer satisfaction are associated with future 
earnings and revenue.13 Similar to the literature examining the value relevance of periodically 
reported KPIs, prior research documents that reported KPIs are useful for predicting future 
financial performance across a variety of industries. For example, prior research finds that 
periodically reported KPIs are useful for predicting future financial performance in the retail 
industry (Ittner and Larcker 1998), the internet industry (Rajgopal et al. 2002), and the 
manufacturing industry (Rajgopal et al. 2003). Finally, Brazel et al. (2009) find evidence that 
inconsistencies between financial performance and KPIs are a leading indicator of fraud. Thus, to 
the extent that quarterly KPI guidance provides analysts with accurate estimates of future 
realizations of KPIs, quarterly KPI guidance should improve analyst estimates of earnings. 
Finally, prior research documents that analysts use KPIs in forming their expectations of 
future earnings. Chandra et al. (1999) examine the semiconductor industry and find evidence that 
analysts revise their sales forecasts in response to an industry-wide KPI provided by a trade 
association, consistent with analysts incorporating information from KPIs in their estimates of 
future financial performance. In addition, Givoly et al. (2019) examine analyst KPI forecasts in 
the airline, oil and gas, retail, and pharmaceutical industries and find evidence that analysts revise 
 
13 Because firms in my sample do not provide forward-looking guidance for on-time arrival rates, mishandled baggage, 
and customer satisfaction, I focus on three measures managers commonly provide guidance on in my analyses (i.e., 
ASM, RASM, and CASM).   
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their earnings forecasts in response to KPI surprises, consistent with analysts incorporating 
information from realized KPIs in their earnings forecasts.  
However, there are also reasons why quarterly KPI guidance may not be useful for analysts 
in forming expectations of future financial performance. First, although prior research generally 
documents a positive association between periodically reported KPIs and future financial 
performance, a common criticism of KPIs is that management discretion in measuring KPIs 
reduces the informativeness of the disclosure. For example, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton stated that 
“A point of investor frustration that we can be cognizant of is when non-GAAP numbers and KPIs 
move around in terms of how they are calculated”.14 Thus, inconsistent measurement of KPIs over 
time and across firms could limit the usefulness of KPI disclosures. Furthermore, if managers use 
inconsistent measures of KPIs in their quarterly KPI guidance, then quarterly KPI guidance could 
be of limited use to analysts in forecasting earnings. Second, although managers are in a position 
to more accurately forecast KPIs relative to analysts, prior research provides evidence that, in 
certain situations, managers have incentives to provide inaccurate or misleading guidance (Rogers 
and Stocken 2005). Together, the increased management discretion in measuring KPIs in quarterly 
KPI guidance along with incentives to provide inaccurate guidance could contribute to there being 
no association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst forecast errors.     
  
 
14 See SEC Urges Consistency in Non-GAAP Reporting available at: 
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2018/dec/sec-urges-consistency-non-gaap-reporting-201820253.html 
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3. Sample and Research Setting 
I begin my sample with all public firms in the airline industry (SIC code 4512) available 
from Compustat for the fiscal years 2008 through 2017. I use the Compustat Industry Specific 
Quarterly database to obtain data on KPIs for the airline industry and restrict the sample to firms 
with non-missing values for ASMs, CASM, and RASM. In addition, because I examine analyst 
forecast revisions to quarterly KPI guidance, I obtain data on analyst forecasts from IBES and 
require firms have at least two analyst earnings forecasts for each quarter.15   
Next, I hand-collect data on quarterly guidance of ASM, RASM, and CASM from Form 
8-K disclosures reported on the SEC’s EDGAR website. I examine every 8-K filing filed between 
the fiscal quarter-end date and one year prior to the fiscal quarter-end to identify the most recent 
quarterly ASM, RASM, and CASM guidance for each firm if available.16 Because I am interested 
in examining the impact of quarterly KPI guidance on analyst forecast errors, for firm-quarters 
that provide quarterly KPI guidance, I require there be a consensus analyst forecast of EPS prior 
to the announcement of KPI guidance and a consensus analyst forecast of EPS following the 
announcement of quarterly KPI guidance. In addition, for each firm-quarter with quarterly KPI 
guidance, I collect management’s estimates for ASM, RASM, and CASM if available. I find that 
quarterly KPI guidance is most often disclosed in monthly traffic reports and earnings 
announcements for prior quarters.17 In addition, firms sometimes provide quarterly KPI guidance 
 
15 The results are qualitatively similar for all other variables when I remove analyst forecast errors and analyst forecast 
horizon from my determinants test and do not restrict the sample to firms with at least two analyst forecasts. 
16 Although I search up to one year prior to the fiscal quarter end for the existence of quarterly KPI guidance, the 
longest forecast horizon in my sample is 101 days between the announcement of quarterly KPI guidance and the fiscal-
quarter end.  
17 Monthly traffic reports are an industry-specific disclosure for firms in the airline industry. Firms are required to file 
monthly traffic reports disclosures to the Department of Transport and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. In 
addition, I find that airline firms also regulary file monthly traffic reports on the SEC EDGAR website in a Form 8-K 
disclosure.  
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in a standalone press release or as part of a Reg FD disclosure following an investor meeting, 
however, these methods of disclosure are less common.  
I examine quarterly KPI guidance in the airline industry for several reasons. First, prior to 
the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 
began requiring that all airlines operating aircraft designed for 60 passengers or more to 
periodically report their actual air traffic (e.g., ASM and cargo capacity) on a monthly basis. This 
data were initially used by the Civil Aeronautics Board (a predecessor to the Federal Aviation 
Administration) to evaluate the capabilities of U.S. airlines and to allocate routes and set fares for 
domestic travel. However, following the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, airlines were allowed 
to compete in a free market and these KPIs were then used by investors and creditors in evaluating 
the operating performance of airlines.18  
Second, unlike industries where actual KPIs are reported on a voluntary basis, historical 
data on KPIs are required to be filed with the DOT for firms in the airline industry, thus, I am 
better able to isolate the impact of quarterly KPI guidance rather than evaluating firms that 
voluntarily provide quarterly KPI guidance conditional on also voluntarily providing actual KPIs 
for prior periods. Finally, the DOT requires that airlines measure actual KPIs reported in historical 
traffic reports using a specified criterion, which lowers management’s discretion in reporting 
realized KPIs to investors. Together, these factors allow me to evaluate the determinants and 
consequences of quarterly KPI guidance in an industry where there is a consistent measurement of 
actual KPIs across firms.  
 
18 For example, in the Standard & Poor’s Corporate Rating Criteria, they list ASM, RASM, and CASM as important 




Table 1 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for firms in my sample.19 Across my sample 
period, I find that 67% of firms provide quarterly KPI guidance. Figure 1 presents the percentage 
of observations that provide quarterly KPI guidance by year. I find that the percentage of firms 
providing KPI guidance increase over my sample period from 44% of firm-quarters in 2008 to 
98% of firm quarters in 2017. Table 1 Panel B compares firm characteristics for firm-quarters with 
quarterly KPI guidance relative to firm-quarters without quarterly KPI guidance. Univariate tests 
reveal that quarterly KPI guidance firm-quarters have lower analyst forecast errors, are less likely 
to provide earnings guidance, have higher analyst following, higher institutional ownership, higher 
growth prospects, higher prior operating performance, lower leverage, and are larger. While these 
descriptive statistics provide some insight on the cross-sectional attributes of firms that provide 
quarterly KPI guidance, in subsequent analyses, I include year fixed effects to control for industry-
wide changes in KPI guidance activity over time and quarter fixed effects to control for seasonality. 
I also include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics that could impact 
a firm’s decision to issue quarterly KPI guidance. 
  
 
19 All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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4. Research Design 
Determinants of Quarterly KPI Guidance 
 In order to examine the determinants of quarterly KPI guidance, I first estimate the 
following model: 
KPIGuidanceit = α0 + α1Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error)it + α2Earnings Guidanceit  
+ α3Log(Analyst Following)it-1 + α4InstOwnit-1 + α5BtMit-1 + α6ROAit-1  
+ α7Lossit-1 + α8Leverageit-1 + α9Sizeit-1 + α10 Initial Analyst Horizonit  
+ αiFirmFEi + αsYearFE + αtQuarterFE + εit   (1) 
Where KPIGuidance is an indicator variable equal to one when a firm provides quarterly KPI 
guidance for quarter t. The coefficients of interest in Equation (1) are α1 through α7 which represent 
the coefficients on the variables identified in Section II as potential determinants of quarterly KPI 
guidance. In addition to the variables identified in Section II, I also control for leverage, firm size, 
and the initial analyst forecast horizon. 
 Next, to examine the determinants of the number of KPIs that firms provide in their 
quarterly KPI guidance, I estimate the following model: 
Num KPIGuidanceit = β0 + β1Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error)it + β2Earnings Guidanceit  
+ β3Log(Analyst Following)it-1 + β4InstOwnit-1 + β5BtMit-1 + β6ROAit-1  
+ β7Lossit-1 + β8Leverageit-1 + β9Sizeit-1 + β10 Initial Analyst Horizonit  
+ βiFirmFEi + βsYearFE + βtQuarterFE + υit    (2) 
Where Num KPIGuidance is measured as the number of unique KPIs that a firm forecasts in its 
quarterly KPI guidance. This variable ranges from 0, if a firm provides no quarterly KPI guidance, 
to 3 if a firm provides guidance for all three KPIs in their quarterly KPI guidance (i.e., ASM, 
RASM, and CASM). The coefficients of interest in Equation (2) are β1 through β7 which allows 
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me to examine whether the same factors that influence a firm’s decision to provide quarterly KPI 
guidance also influence the number of items that a firm forecasts in its quarterly KPI guidance.  
Quarterly KPI Guidance and Analyst Forecast Errors 
 In order to test whether quarterly KPI guidance is associated with reductions in analyst 
forecast errors, I estimate the following model: 
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error) = θ0 + θ1KPIGuidance / Num KPIGuidance + θ2Earnings Guidanceit  
+ θ3Log(Analyst Following)it-1 + θ4InstOwnit-1 + θ5BtMit-1 + θ6ROAit-1  
+ θ7Lossit-1 + θ8Leverageit-1 + θ9Sizeit-1 + θ10 Last Analyst Horizonit 
+ θ10 Initial Analyst Horizonit + θ10Analyst Forecast Distanceit  
+ θiFirmFEi + θsYearFE + θtQuarterFE + μt   (3) 
Where ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error) is measured as the difference between the absolute value of the 
last analyst EPS forecast error and the absolute value of the initial analyst EPS forecast error. 
Because analysts can incorporate more information into their EPS forecast when  I include Last 
Analyst Horizon to control for the number of days between the last consensus analyst EPS forecast 
and the fiscal quarter end, Initial Analyst Horizon to control for the number of days between the 
initial consensus analyst EPS forecast and the fiscal quarter end date, and Analyst Forecast 
Distance to control for the number of days between the initial consensus analyst EPS forecast and 
the last analyst EPS forecast. The coefficient of interest in Equation (3) is θ1, which captures the 
association between the presence of quarterly KPI guidance (KPIGuidance) or the number of KPIs 
forecasted in quarterly KPI guidance (Num KPIGuidance) and the change in analyst forecast errors 
for EPS. 
 Although Equation (3) allows me to examine whether firms that provide quarterly KPI 
guidance experience greater reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors, it is not clear whether this 
reduction results in more accurate analyst forecasts of EPS. For example, if managers provide 
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quarterly KPI guidance in response to inaccurate initial analyst EPS estimates of future earnings 
then a reduction in analyst forecast errors may not result in more accurate anlyst EPS estimates. 
Thus, in order to examine whether quarterly KPI guidance is associated with lower analyst forecast 
errors following the release of quarterly KPI guidance, I estimate the following model: 
Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) = δ0 + δ1KPIGuidance / Num KPIGuidance  
+ δ2Earnings Guidanceit + δ3Log(Analyst Following)it-1 + δ4InstOwnit-1  
+ δ5BtMit-1 + δ6ROAit-1 + δ7Lossit-1 + δ8Leverageit-1 + δ9Sizeit-1  
+ δ10 Last Analyst Horizonit + δiFirmFEi + δsYearFE + δtQuarterFE + ηt   (4) 
Where Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) is the absolute value of actual EPS less the last consensus 
analyst EPS prior to the end of the fiscal quarter.20 The coefficient of interest in Equation (4) is δ1, 
which captures the association between the presence of quarterly KPI guidance and the level of 
the consensus analyst EPS forecast errors. Because initial analyst EPS errors are larger for firms 
that provide quarterly KPI guidance, this test allows me to examine whether the reduction in 
analyst forecast errors following quarterly KPI guidance documented in Equation (3) is large 
enough to overcome these initially higher analyst EPS forecast errors and whether it results in 




20 I use the consensus prior to the end of the quarter rather than the earnings announcement date to avoid including 
analyst estimates that are made after earnings or KPI preannouncements by management following the end of the 
fiscal quarter. 
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5. Empirical Results 
 
Determinants of Quarterly KPI Guidance 
Table 2 presents the results from estimating Equation (1) to examine the determinants of 
quarterly KPI guidance. In Column (1), where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal 
to one when a firm provides quarterly KPI guidance for at least one KPI, the coefficient on 
Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error) is positive and significant (α1 = 0.258 p = 0.004), indicating that 
firms are more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance following inaccurate initial analyst 
estimates of earnings. This result provides some evidence that managers may use quarterly KPI 
guidance to provide analysts with additional information about the operations of the firm to reduce 
analyst earnings forecast errors.21 Consistent with managers providing quarterly KPI guidance 
when there is a greater demand for information from analysts, the coefficient on Log(Analyst 
Following) is positive and significant (α3 = 0.275 p = 0.000). I also find that the coefficient on BtM 
is negative and significant (α5 = -0.046 p = 0.001), indicating that firms are more likely to provide 
quarterly KPI guidance when growth prospects are high. While the coefficient on ROA is not 
significant (α6 = 0.102 p = 0.818), the coefficient on Loss is positive and significant (α7 = 0.157 p 
= 0.000). Thus, while I find no evidence of an association between the level of prior period earnings 
and a firm’s quarterly KPI guidance decision, firms are more likely to provide quarterly KPI 
guidance when they experience a loss in the prior quarter.  
 
21 This is consistent with anecdotal observations of management providing quarterly KPI guidance following analyst 
stock upgrades. For example, on August 29th, analysts at Deutche Bank state that JetBlue had  “[a] good balance 
sheet, solid market position, primarily domestic operator and costs under control as it is on track to achieve it flat to 
1% 2018 - 2020 CASM CAGR goal.” See Here are the biggest analyst calls of the day:Monster, JetBlue & More 
Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/28/monster-jetblue-papa-johns-autodesk-are-analyst-calls-of-the-
day.html. However, on September 4th, JetBlue released quarterly KPI guidance that showed that while CASM growth 
was expected to be in line with Deutche Bank’s expectations, RASM was expected to fall below expectations. See 
JetBlue slides after lowing guidance on Dorian impact, demand concerns Available at: 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/04/jetblue-slides-after-lowering-guidance-on-dorian-demand-concerns.html. 
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Table 2 Column (2) presents the results from estimating Equation (2), which examines the 
determinants of the number of KPIs that a firm forecasts in its KPI guidance. In general, the results 
are consistent with the results documented in Table 2 Column (1) where I examine the 
determinants of firms providing quarterly KPI guidance for at least one KPI. Specifically, I find a 
positive association for Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error) (β1 = 0.308 p = 0.050), 
Log(AnalystFollowing) (β3 = 0.779 p = 0.000), and Loss (β7 = 0.267 p = 0.001) and a negative 
association for BtM (β5 = -0.085 p = 0.002) and the number of items forecasted in a firm’s quarterly 
KPI guidance. Together, these results indicate that the same determinants that influence a 
manager’s decision to issue quarterly KPI guidance also influence the number of items that 
managers forecast in their quarterly KPI guidance.  
Quarterly KPI Guidance and Analyst Forecast Errors 
Table 3 presents the results from estimating Equation (3), which investigates the 
association between quarterly KPI guidance and changes in absolute analyst EPS forecast errors. 
In Column (1), where the variable of interest is KPIGuidance, I find a negative and significant 
coefficient on KPIGuidance (θ1 = -0.026 p = 0.005), consistent with larger reductions in analyst 
EPS forecast errors when firms provide quarterly KPI guidance in the period between the initial 
analyst EPS forecast and the last analyst EPS forecast. Consistent with the results in Column (1), 
I also find a negative and significant coefficient on Num KPIGuidance (θ1 = -0.006 p = 0.041). 
This result indicates that not only is the presence of quarterly KPI guidance associated with 
reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors but the number of items that managers forecast in their 
quarterly KPI guidance is also associated with reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors. 
Table 4 presents the results from estimating Equation (4), which investigates whether 
quarterly KPI guidance is associated with the absolute value of the last consensus analyst EPS 
estimate prior to the end of the fiscal quarter. In Column (1), the coefficient on KPIGuidance is 
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negative and significant (δ1 = -0.025 p = 0.053). Although firms are more likely to provide 
quarterly KPI guidance when initial analyst EPS forecast errors are larger, this result indicates that 
the reduction in analyst forecast errors quarter for firms that provide quarterly KPI guidance 
documented in Table 3 is large enough to overcome these higher initial analyst EPS forecast errors 
which results in more accurate analyst forecasts of EPS at the end of the fiscal quarter. Consistent 
with the results documented in Column (1) the coefficient on Num KPIGuidance is also negative 
and significant (δ1 = -0.007 p = 0.023) in Column (2).  
Additional Analyses 
Bundled Quarterly KPI and Earnings Guidance and Analyst Forecast Errors 
 Prior literature finds that the value relevance of management guidance varies with the 
amount of additional information accompanying earnings guidance. For example, Hutton et al. 
(2003) find that there is a larger market reaction to upward revisions in management earnings 
guidance when the guidance is accompanied by qualitative narrative disclosures. Thus, I next test 
whether the association between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst forecast errors varies when 
managers provide quarterly KPI guidance alongside quarterly earnings guidance (i.e., bundled KPI 
guidance). Specifically, because quarterly KPI guidance provides analysts with information about 
management decisions that contribute to future financial performance, bundled KPI guidance may 
be incrementally informative to stand-alone quarterly KPI guidance in helping analysts revise their 
forecasts.22 To test this, I estimate Equations (3) and (4) including an interaction between 
KPIGuidance (Num KPIGuidance) and Earnings Guidance. 
 
22 For example, a firm in the airline industry that supplements quarterly earnings guidance with quarterly KPI guidance 
can provide analysts with information about whether they plan to meet this target through increasing ASM, increasing 
RASM, or decreasing CASM.  
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Table 5 presents the results from estimating Equation (3) including the interaction term, 
KPIGuidance(Num KPIGuidance)*Earnings Guidance. While I continue to find a significant 
association between quarterly KPI guidance and reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors in 
Columns (1) and (2) (θ1 = -0.026 p = 0.007; θ1 = -0.006 p = 0.043), I do not find a significant 
association between the interaction term KPIGuidance(Num KPIGuidance)*Earnings Guidance 
and changes in analyst EPS forecast errors (θ2  = -0.005 p = 0.383; θ2 = -0.003 p = 0.296). This test 
reveals that the reduction in analyst EPS forecast errors for firms that provide quarterly KPI 
guidance does not vary between firm-quarters when managers provide stand-alone quarterly KPI 
guidance and firm-quarters when managers provide bundled KPI and earnings guidance.  
Table 6 presents the results from estimating Equation (4) including the interaction term, 
KPIGuidance(Num KPIGuidance)*Earnings Guidance. The coefficient on KPIGuidance  
(Num KPIGuidance) is negative and significant (δ1 = -0.023 p = 0.073; δ1 = -0.007 p = 0.026), 
consistent lower analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the fiscal quarter for firm-quarters when 
management provides stand-alone quarterly KPI guidance. In addition, the coefficient on the 
interaction term, KPIGuidance(Num KPIGuidance)*Earnings Guidance is also negative and 
significant (δ2 = -0.021 p = 0.066; δ2 = -0.009 p = 0.070). This result indicates that while the 
reduction in analyst EPS forecast errors is no different for stand-alone KPI guidance and bundled 
KPI guidance, analyst EPS forecast errors are lower at the end of the quarter in firm-quarters when 
management provides bundled KPI and earnings guidance.  
Quarterly KPI Guidance Form and Analyst Forecast Errors 
 Prior literature finds evidence that management earnings guidance is more informative 
when managers provide forecasts of point estimates of earnings relative to when they provide a 
range forecast (Baginski et al. 1993; Hughes and Pae 2004). Thus, to the extent that managers are 
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more likely to report point estimates in quarterly KPI guidance when they are more certain that the 
KPI target will be realized in the future, the association between quarterly KPI guidance and 
reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors should be greater for point forecasts relative to range 
forecasts of KPIs. To test this, I create two indicator variables, KPIGuidance_Point 
(KPIGuidance_Range), set equal to one when managers provide point estimates (range forecasts) 
in their quarterly KPI guidance. Next I estimate Equations (3) and (4) and replace KPIGuidance 
with the KPIGuidance_Point and KPIGuidance_Range. In untabulated results, I find a negative 
and significant coefficient on both KPIGuidance_Point and KPIGuidance_Range in both models. 
Furthermore, although the magnitude of the negative coefficient is larger for KPIGuidance_Point 
relative to KPIGuidance_Range, an F-test reveals that the coefficients are not statistically different 




 In this study, I examine the determinants and consequences of management guidance of 
KPIs in the airline industry. Using a sample of 457 firm-quarter observations from 2008 through 
2017, I find that, on average, firms are more likely to provide quarterly KPI guidance and a larger 
number of KPIs in quarterly KPI guidance when initial analyst EPS forecast errors are large, when 
there is higher analyst following, when a firm has higher growth prospects, and when a firm 
experiences a loss in the prior quarter. Together, these results provide evidence that managers issue 
quarterly KPI guidance in response to analyst uncertainty and when there is a greater demand for 
information by analysts. In subsequent tests, I examine whether quarterly KPI guidance is 
associated with improvements in analyst forecasts and find that quarterly KPI guidance is 
associated with larger reductions in analyst EPS forecast errors relative to firms that do not provide 
quarterly KPI guidance which results in lower analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the fiscal 
quarter for firms that provide quarterly KPI guidance. Finally, I find that the negative association 
between quarterly KPI guidance and analyst EPS forecast errors at the end of the period is more 
pronounced when firms provide bundled quarterly KPI guidance (i.e., quarterly KPI guidance 
accompanied by quarterly earnings guidance) relative to stand-alone quarter KPI guidance. 
Together, these results provide evidence that managers provide quarterly KPI guidance in 
response to inaccurate initial analyst EPS forecasts and, after providing quarterly KPI guidance, 
firms experience improvements in analyst forecasts of earnings. In addition, this study provides 
evidence that quarterly KPI guidance is a complimentary forward-looking disclosure that 
managers can use to improve analyst estimates of earnings. However, I also acknowledge that 
because my analyses are conducted in the airline industry, the results may not be generalizable to 
27 





Ajinkya, B. B., and M. J. Gift. 1984. Corporate managers’ earnings forecasts and symmetrical 
adjustments of market expectations. Journal of Accounting Research 22 (2): 425–444. 
 
Ajinkya, B. B., S. Bhojraj, and P. Sengupta. 2005. The association between outside directors, 
institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of 
Accounting Research 43 (3): 343–376. 
 
Amir, E., and B. Lev. 1996 Value-relevance of nonfinancial information: The wireless 
communication industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 22 (1): 3-30.  
 
Anilowski, C., M. Feng, and D. J. Skinner. 2007. Does earnings guidance affect market returns? 
The nature and information content of aggregate earnings guidance. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 44 (1–2): 36–63. 
 
Atiase, R. K., H. Li, S. Supattarakul, and S. Tse. 2005. Market reaction to multiple 
contemporaneous earnings signals: Earnings announcements and future earnings 
guidance. Review of Accounting Studies 10: 497–525. 
 
Baginski, S. P., and J. M. Hassell. 1990. The market interpretation of management earnings 
forecasts as a predictor of subsequent financial analyst forecast revision. The 
Accounting Review 65 (1): 175–190. 
 
Baginski, S. P.,  E. J. Conrad, and J. M. Hassell. 1993. The effects of management forecast 
precision on equity pricing and on the assessment of earnings uncertainty. The 
Accounting Review 68 (4): 913–927. 
 
Behn, B. K., and R. A. Riley. 1999. Using nonfinancial measures to predict financial 
performance: The case of the U.S. airline industry. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, 
and Finance 14 (1) 29-56.  
 
Brazel, J. F., K. L. Jones, and M. F. Zimbelman. 2009. Using nonfinancial measures to assess 
fraud risk. Journal of Accounting Research 47 (5): 1135-1166. 
 
Bushee, B., and C. F. Noe. 2000. Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and stock 
return volatility. Journal of Accounting Research 38: 171–202. 
 
CFA Institute. 2006. Breaking the short-term cycle: Discussion and recommendations on how 
corporate leaders, asset managers, investors, and analysts can refocus on long-term 
value. CFA Institute, Business Institute Roundtable for Corporate Ethics. 
 
Chandra, U., A. Procassini, and G. Waymire. 1999. The use of trade association disclosures by 
investors and analysts: Evidence from the semiconductor industry. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 16 (4): 643-670.  
 
29 
Chapman, K., and J. R. Green. 2018. Analysts’ influence on managers’ guidance. The 
Accounting Review 93 (1): 45-69. 
 
Givoly, D. Y. Li, B. Laurie, and A. Nekrasov. 2019. Key performance indicators as supplements 
to earnings: incremental informativeness, demand factors, measurement issues, and 
properties of their forecasts. Working Paper.  
 
Graham, J., C. R. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. 2005. The economic implications of corporate 
financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40: 3–73. 
 
Healy, P., A. Hutton, and K. Palepu. 1999. Stock performance and intermediation changes 
surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research 16 
(3): 485–520. 
 
Hirst, D. E., L. Koonce, and S. Venkataraman. 2008. Management earnings forecasts: a review 
and framework. Accounting Horizons. 22 (3): 315-338.  
 
Houston, J., B. Lev, and J. W. Tucker. 2010. To guide or not to guide? Causes and consequences 
of stopping and subsequently resuming earnings guidance. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 27 (1): 143-185.  
 
Hutton, A. P., G. S. Miller, and D. J. Skinner. 2003. The role of supplementary statements with 
management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (5): 867–890. 
 
Hutton, A. P., L. F. Lee, S. and Z. Shu. 2012. Do managers always know better? The relative 
accuracy of management and analyst forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 50 (5): 
1217-1244.  
 
Hughes, J., and S. Pae. 2004. Voluntary disclosure of precision information. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 37: 261–289. 
 
Hughes, K. E. 2000. The value relevance of nonfinancial measures of air pollution in the electric 
utility industry. The Accounting Review 75 (2): 209-228.  
 
Ittner, C. D., and D. F. Larcker. 1998. Are nonfinancial measures leading indicators of financial 
performance? An analysis of customer satisfaction. Journal of Accounting Research 36: 
1-35.  
 
Miller, G. 2002. Earnings performance and discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting 
Research 40 (1): 173–204. 
 
Riley, A. R., T. A. Pearson, and G. Trompeter. 2003. The value relevance of non-financial 
performance variables and accounting information: the case of the airline industry. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 22: 231-254.  
 
30 
Rogers, J. L., and P. C. Stocken. 2005. Credibility of management forecasts. The Accounting 
Review 80 (4): 1233–1260. 
 
Rajgopal, S., M. Venkatachalam, and S. Kotha. 2002. Managerial actions, stock returns, and 
earnings: the case of business-to-business internet firms. Journal of Accounting 
Research 40 (2): 529-556.  
 
Rajgopal, S., T. Shevlin, and M. Venkatachalam. 2003. Does the stock market fully appreciate 
the implications of leading indicators of future earnings? Evidence from order backlog. 
Review of Accounting Studies 8: 461-492. 
 
Trueman, B. M. H. Wong, and X. Zhang. 2000. The eyeballs have it: searching for the value in 
internet stocks. Journal of Accounting Research 38: 137-162. 
 
Verrecchia, R. 1983. Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5: 179–
194. 
 
Waymire, G. 1986. Additional evidence on the accuracy of analyst forecasts before and after 
voluntary management earnings forecasts. The Accounting Review 61 (1): 129-143. 
 
Williams, P. A. 1996. The relation between a prior earnings forecast by management and analyst 
response to a current management forecast. The Accounting Review 71 (1): 103–115. 
  
31 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions: 
Variable Description 
Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error) The absolute value of the difference between Actual EPS 
and the first consensus analyst EPS forecast for quarter t 
scaled by stock price. The first consensus analyst EPS 
forecast is measured as the first consensus analyst EPS 
forecast made in the year preceding the fiscal quarter end 
date. 
Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) The absolute value of the difference between Actual EPS 
and the last consensus analyst EPS forecast for quarter t 
scaled by stock price. The last consensus analyst EPS 
forecast is measured as the last consensus analyst EPS 
forecast made prior to the end of the fiscal quarter. 
Log(Analyst Following) The natural log of the number of unique analysts that 
forecast firm i's EPS for quarter t-1.  
Analyst Forecast Distance The number of days between the initial consensus analyst 
EPS forecast and the last consensus analyst EPS forecast 
for firm i for quarter t.  
BtM The book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity in quarter t-1. 
Earnings Guidance An indicator variable equal to one if firm i provides 
guidance for at least one KPI (i.e., ASM, RASM, or 
CASM) for quarter t in the previous year, and zero 
otherwise. 
Initial Analyst Horizon The number of days between the initial consensus analyst 
EPS forecast and the fiscal quarter end date for firm i for 
quarter t.   
InstOwn The percentage of outstanding shares owned by 
institutional owners. 
KPIGuidance An indicator variable equal to one if firm i provides 
guidance for at least one KPI (i.e., ASM, RASM, or 
CASM) for quarter t.  
Last Analyst Horizon The number of days between the last consensus analyst 
EPS forecast made prior to the end of the fiscal quarter and 
the fiscal quarter end date for firm i for quarter t.   
Leverage Long term debt divided by the book value of equity in 
quarter t-1.  
Loss An indicator variable set equal to one when ROA is 
negative in quarter t-1, and 0 otherwise.  
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Num KPIGuidance The count of the number of unique KPIs forecasted by firm 
i in quarterly KPI guidance for quarter t ranging from 0 
(i.e., firm i does not provide quarterly KPI guidance for 
quarter t) to 3 (i.e., firm i provides quarterly KPI guidance 
for ASM, RASM, and CASM for quarter t).  
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by average total 
assets in quarter t-1. 
Size The natural log of total assets in quarter t-1.  
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error) Change in absolute analyst EPS forecast errors measured as 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Airline Firms Providing Quarterly KPI 
Guidance
 
Table 1  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev  1% Median 99% 
KPIGuidance 0.652 0.477 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Num KPIGuidance 1.560 1.271 0.000 2.000 3.000 
Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error) 0.050 0.139 0.000 0.009 0.976 
Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) 0.025 0.104 0.000 0.002 0.788 
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error) -0.026 0.072 -0.496 -0.005 0.060 
Earnings Guidance 0.066 0.248 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Analyst Following 10.972 4.556 1 12 18 
InstOwn 0.809 0.192 0.000 0.843 1.000 
BtM 0.987 1.644 0.021 0.469 12.412 
ROA 0.009 0.027 -0.118 0.008 0.084 
Loss 0.212 0.409 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Leverage 0.336 0.157 0.013 0.346 0.672 
Size 8.683 1.508 2.964 8.675 10.884 
Initial Analyst Horizon 307.302 47.395 42 317 350 
Last Analyst Horizon 19.009 15.647 11 16 105 
Number of Observations 457         
Table 1 Panel A reports the summary statistics for variables in Equations (1) through (4). All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Panel B: Differences in Means 
  KPIGuidance = 1 KPIGuidance = 0     
Variable Mean Mean Difference p-value 
Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error) 0.034 0.080 -0.046*** (0.005) 
Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) 0.008 0.058 -0.050*** (0.000) 
ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error) -0.025 -0.026 0.001 (0.931) 
Earnings Guidance 0.027 0.138 -0.112*** (0.000) 
Analyst Following 12.399 8.296 4.104*** (0.000) 
InstOwn 0.854 0.723 0.131*** (0.000) 
BtM 0.563 1.782 -1.220*** (0.000) 
ROA 0.013 0.002 0.011** (0.016) 
Loss 0.208 0.220 -0.012 (0.766) 
Leverage 0.311 0.382 -0.071*** (0.000) 
Size 8.951 8.182 0.769*** (0.000) 
Initial Analyst Horizon 317.560 288.075 29.485*** (0.001) 
Last Analyst Horizon 16.406 23.887 -7.481** (0.026) 
Number of Observations 298 159     
Table 1 Panel B reports univariate statistics for variables in Equations (1) through (4). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate significant at p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  
 
Table 2 
Determinants of quarterly KPI Guidance  






Abs(Initial Analyst EPS Error) (+) 0.258*** 0.308** 
  (0.004) (0.050) 
Earnings Guidance (?) 0.056 -0.041 
  (0.345) (0.596) 
Log(AnalystFollowing) (+) 0.275*** 0.779*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
InstOwn (?) 0.135 -0.279 
  (0.309) (0.304) 
BtM (-) -0.046*** -0.085*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
ROA (?) 0.102 0.939 
  (0.818) (0.387) 
Loss (?) 0.157*** 0.267*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
Leverage  -0.075 0.463 
  (0.652) (0.331) 
Size  -0.216*** 0.300* 
  (0.004) (0.084) 
Initial Analyst Horizon  0.000 0.000 
  (0.388) (0.690) 
Constant  2.000*** -3.853** 
  (0.007) (0.024) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects   Yes Yes 
Observations   457 457 
Adjusted R-squared   0.761 0.817 
Table 2 Columns 1 and 2 reports the results from estimating Equations (1) and (2), 
respectively. p-values are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are one-
tailed for variables with a signed prediction and two-tailed otherwise. ***, **, and * 
indicated significance at the p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. t-tests are 






Quarterly KPI Guidance and Changes in Absolute Analyst EPS Forecast Error 
  (1) (2) 
  ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error) ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error) 
KPIGuidance -0.026***  
 (0.005)  
Num KPIGuidance  -0.006** 
  (0.041) 
Earnings Guidance 0.007 0.005 
 (0.506) (0.620) 
Log(AnalystFollowing) -0.010 -0.013 
 (0.623) (0.553) 
InstOwn -0.029 -0.034 
 (0.485) (0.426) 
BtM -0.020** -0.019** 
 (0.022) (0.026) 
ROA 0.226 0.228 
 (0.363) (0.358) 
Loss -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.367) (0.246) 
Leverage -0.047 -0.042 
 (0.282) (0.337) 
Size 0.040* 0.048** 
 (0.089) (0.050) 
Last Analyst Horizon -0.001** -0.001** 
 
(0.019) (0.015) 
Initial Analyst Horizon -0.001* -0.001* 
 
(0.057) (0.057) 
Analyst Forecast Distance 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.051) (0.055) 
Constant -0.279 -0.353* 
 (0.171) (0.090) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 457 457 
Adjusted R-squared 0.376 0.371 
Table 3 reports the results from estimating Equation (3). p-values are in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates and are one-tailed for my variable of interest and two-tailed otherwise. ***, **, 
and * indicated significance at the p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. t-tests are estimated 




Quarterly KPI Guidance and Last Absolute Analyst EPS Forecast Error 
  (1) (2) 
  Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) 
KPIGuidance -0.025*  
 (0.053)  
Num KPIGuidance  -0.007** 
  (0.023) 
Earnings Guidance 0.017 0.016 
 (0.106) (0.153) 
Log(AnalystFollowing) 0.035 0.033 
 (0.152) (0.195) 
InstOwn -0.149** -0.155** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
BtM 0.005 0.006 
 (0.676) (0.664) 
ROA -0.584 -0.583 
 (0.213) (0.215) 
Loss -0.020* -0.022** 
 (0.068) (0.035) 
Leverage -0.011 -0.006 
 (0.814) (0.901) 
Size -0.001 0.007 
 (0.981) (0.775) 
Last Analyst Horizon -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.112) (0.107) 
Constant 0.082 0.005 
 (0.684) (0.978) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 457 457 
Adjusted R-squared 0.396 0.393 
Table 4 Columns 1 and 2 reports the results from estimating Equation (4), respectively. p-values are in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are one-tailed for my variable of interest and two tailed 
otherwise. ***, **, and * indicated significance at the p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. t-tests 





Quarterly KPI Guidance with Eearnings Guidance and Changes in Absolute Analyst EPS Forecast Error 
  (1) (2) 
  ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error) ΔAbs(Analyst EPS Error) 
KPIGuidance -0.026***  
 (0.007)  
KPIGuidance*Earnings Guidance -0.005  
 (0.383)  
Num KPIGuidance  -0.006** 
  (0.043) 
Num KPIGuidance*Earnings Guidance  -0.003 
  (0.296) 
Earnings Guidance 0.009 0.008 
 (0.582) (0.599) 
Log(AnalystFollowing) -0.010 -0.013 
 (0.615) (0.546) 
InstOwn -0.029 -0.034 
 (0.489) (0.431) 
BtM -0.020** -0.019** 
 (0.022) (0.027) 
ROA 0.226 0.229 
 (0.363) (0.357) 
Loss -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.370) (0.252) 
Leverage -0.047 -0.042 
 (0.287) (0.333) 
Size 0.040* 0.048** 
 (0.094) (0.050) 
Last Analyst Horizon -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.019) (0.016) 
Initial Analyst Horizon -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.058) (0.057) 
Analyst Forecast Distance 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.051) (0.055) 
Constant -0.277 -0.353* 
 (0.176) (0.090) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 457 457 
Adjusted R-squared 0.374 0.369 
Table 5 reports the results examining quarterly KPI guidance as a compliment to earnings guidance for the last analyst 
forecast error. p-values are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are one-tailed for my variable of interest 
and two-tailed otherwise. ***, **, and * indicated significance at the p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. t-tests 





Quarterly KPI Guidance with Earnings Guidance and Last Absolute Analyst EPS Forecast Error 
  (1) (2) 
  Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) Abs(Last Analyst EPS Error) 
KPIGuidance  -0.023*  
 (0.073)  
KPIGuidance*Earnings Guidance -0.021*  
 (0.066)  
Num KPIGuidance  -0.007** 
  (0.026) 
Num KPIGuidance*Earnings Guidance  -0.009* 
  (0.070) 
Earnings Guidance 0.027* 0.022 
 (0.092) (0.126) 
Log(AnalystFollowing) 0.034 0.032 
 (0.163) (0.202) 
InstOwn -0.148** -0.154** 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
BtM 0.005 0.006 
 (0.671) (0.661) 
ROA -0.583 -0.581 
 (0.215) (0.217) 
Loss -0.020* -0.022** 
 (0.071) (0.038) 
Leverage -0.009 -0.006 
 (0.842) (0.890) 
Size -0.002 0.007 
 (0.944) (0.774) 
Last Analyst Horizon -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.112) (0.108) 
Constant 0.093 0.006 
 (0.645) (0.976) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 457 457 
Adjusted R-squared 0.396 0.392 
Table 6 reports the results examining quarterly KPI guidance as a compliment to earnings guidance for the last 
analyst forecast error. p-values are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are one-tailed for my 
variable of interest and two tailed otherwise. ***, **, and * indicated significance at the p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. t-tests are estimated using cluster robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  
 
